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sub_dividedI finished a paper today!! And then I got an email saying that I was too late ;_;. But at least I'll get credit for the class, which was really all I was after. :D And honestly, it felt so good to finish that even when the email came in, it didn't really dent the sparkle. ^_^ (Well...mostly. -_-)
What happened was that my parents, grandfather, uncle and younger brother all drove out to offer support (and attend the commencement ceremony, which is tomorrow). Then my brother sat behind me ALL DAY TODAY until the paper was finished. Exactly as if he were one of those tyrannical Japanese live-in editors. -_-; I felt a bit bad for monopolizing his time, but when I asked him later, he said he enjoyed it. How sick is that?!
Sick or not, having him there was INSANELY HELPFUL. I'm used to writing all my papers alone, you see. I never finish far enough ahead of deadline to bother with peer review, and since all my friends are in the sciences (not the social sciences), I don't even really have anyone I can talk over my ideas with. (In retrospect, I should probably have just called home and talked to my parents, or something.) So writing papers was always very lonely.
Plus, I have a bad habit going obsessive when I can least afford it -- reading my opening paragraph 29 times without being able to move on, checking a quick reference and not being able to pry myself away from the book, or (in this case) spend far, far too much time on the outline. (I really had problems tearing myself away from the outline. It's seven pages. Single-spaced. The paper itself was only supposed to be 10 pages (double-spaced)! ORZ X INFINITY.) Having my brother there was great; having any warm body there to look over my shoulder and point out that I rewrote that paragraph five times already, how many more times do I want to re-write it, would have been a blessing.
What this is all leading up to is, I worked fairly hard on this paper and I didn't get any credit on it. THEREFORE (the reasoning goes), I should post it to livejournal. But the paper would be overkillalso I never want to look at it ever again, so instead, I'll just post the outline.
Just humor me okay Without further ado:
Lessons of the Davao Mutiny
I reviewed the personal correspondence of Harry Hill Bandholtz from January 1909, when he and his wife returned to their house in Manila after an extended vacation and Bandholtz resumed his post as director of the Philippine Constabulary, through July 1909, when Bandholtz outlined his vision for the Constabulary based on what he saw as its major strengths and weaknesses, informed by the "lessons" he learned from the mutiny of eleven Constabulary recruits in Davao, Mindanao, on June 6, 1909.
Bandholtz' letters are a series of conversations. There are, first of all, cases of a single topic sustained between two people. Looking through these, I was able to follow the threads of various events are they unfolded over the course of the six month period I was examining. There are a number of these threads in the paper, which I will try to relate back to my central theme.
Another way to view the letters as conversation is to compare multiple letters on a single topic. Bandholtz had a habit of recounting the same event to a pool of regular correspondents, each time writing with a slightly different tone -- different levels of formality or forthrightness -- depending on Bandholtz's relationship with the recipient, their "security clearance," the purpose of the letter, etc. By comparing multiple versions of the same event, I wanted to get a sense -- not necessarily of what Bandholtz "really thought," but of which facts he believed were the most worth mentioning, which he considered unsuitable for a larger audience, and, finally, where his various correspondents stood in relation to himself.
Because Bandholtz's personal correspondence naturally lends itself to conversation in this way, this paper will be organized, not by theme, but by topic. What I mean is that rather than begin with conclusions and then present letters as they relate to these conclusions, the paper is instead organized around topics of conversation, with conclusions drawn from each topic then related back to an overall set of conclusions.
Networking
Bandholtz maintained a series of sometimes distinct, sometimes overlapping networks.
-fraternal societies (Saladin Temple, Masonic Squires, Order of Angell, A.A.O.N.M.S, Knights Templar) and old army buddies
--letters: 5/4 to Captain HF Reuthers, 5/6 to son Will, 5/15 to unknown, 5/29 from Harbord, 6/13 to Commander NW Gilbert
--letters: 6/2 to George Geo D (?), 7/17 from G Curry the governor of New Mexico, many many more
-US politicians (calling in favors -- much more regular, informal, informative letters to army friends though)
--6/03 to Rep. EL Hamilton, 6/03 to Sen. Burrows, "friends" working toward Judge Trent's Supreme Court appointment
Philippine Politicians (getting things done with assistance from Quezon and Osmena), Manilla Business, Police, the Times
--3/11 to Cap. GM Wray of the Scouts, building a railroad with Quezon
--5/28 from Harbord, working with opposition politicians to end strikes
--6/5 to Harbord, "good relations" with police
--7/3 to M Egan, editor of the Manila Times, "very helpful"
Short section, not much more than dropping names, illustrating the importance of informal networks, what they can and can't accomplish. Bandholtz' power lies with the army -- mostly with officers also posted, or formerly posted, to the Philippines, or with bureaucrats in the War Department who rely on him for information -- and with a specific set of Philippine politicians with whom he is personally acquainted. Basic projects in the Philippines rely on native cooperation; Bandholtz' influence on US politicians is limited. Nevertheless, the sense of being at the center of a personal universe is strong, supported by a continual stream of personal requests for promotion. This causes an inflated sense of own importance, illustrated by incident involving a local business owner and his Filippina employee (his high-handed intercession gets her fired -- 3/11). Furthermore, as this network is based on correspondence, skill as a letter-writer becomes all-important; Bandholtz is inclined to view favorably, and promote, those officers who can write good letters and/or throw good parties. But inter-American social skills do not necessarily translate to good relations with Filipino politicians (which are crucial!!!) or skilled administration. (See: Dillworth Ford and Cap. Griffith, more on them later.) Bandholtz himself warns cronies Rivers and Harbord off this kind of "country clubism" as it relates to the supposed unfitness of Captain Dietritch to be senior inspector (4/07 letter to Harbord, in response to 4/04 letter from Harbord).
The Philippine Assembly
When Harbord returns to Philippines in January, it's his first time seeing the Philippine Assembly "in action." His reaction to the assembly is typical of the way he processes information generally: first cautious interest, then an initial assessment, then analysis of what they can do for him and him for them, and then, finally, dismissal once he feels he has understood the limits of the arrangement and the terms on which it operates. Overlying all this is a casually dismissive attitude: generally the "antics" of the Assembly are harmless, sometimes they are a (fatal) distraction from the real work at hand.
Initial Impressions
1/9/07 to Honorable AL Lawshe, Assistant Post-master General
2/20 to Mr. HF Colman (stamp buddy)
Uses
2/26 to Major Henry T. Allen
2/26 to General CR Edwards, War Department
5/17 to Forbes
Limitations/Dismissal
5/04 to Captain HF Reuthers
5/10 to George Mooser, China Mutual Life Insurance Co. Shanghai
5/17 to General CR Edwards, War Department
6/22 to Geo B Colton, War Department
7/04 to ????
The Case of Dillworth Ford
Upon return, Harbord sent out letters soliciting suggestions from Constabulary officers on how best the outfit could be improved. He received only one reply (or only he felt was worth retaining), from officer Dillworth Ford. Ford's letter is remarkable, first because it well-written (almost on the level of Bandholtz' own letters) and second because Bandholtz attempted to put into practice nearly every suggestion in it -- with mixed results). Ford himself was promoted two ranks, which seems to have caused some problems for him; additionally, he was assigned to a post (Senior inspector) he seems not to have been entirely qualified for. This illustrates 1) the primacy Bandholtz placed on a single skill set, in this case the ability to write a good letter, and 2) the lack of sufficiently talented, qualified, and connected young American officers to fill essential posts within the Constabulary, a topic also addressed in the letter itself.
Letters:
2/3, the initial letter from Ford
3/31, first attempt to institute advice
5/6 to Col Herman Hall @ Iloilo, "in regard to Ford, I guess you are right, he will never make a good senior inspector"
6/5 to Harbord, problems implementing Ford's advice
6/6 to Major Ralph Jones, Iloilo more problems re: Ford's advice (in response Bandholtz' letter of 4/17)
Officer Griffith
Harbord met officer Griffith, the senior inspector of Zamboangas, while on tour in the south. He formed a favorable impression of his social characters (while harboring doubts on his abilities), and immediately added him to his networks of correspondents, as well as promoting him (to major - 7/19 letter to Harbord), thus securing his place among both formal and informal power networks.
7/5 to Harbord, Griffith has "done wonders for the social atmosphere down here" but has the following flaws
7/28 to Griffith, confidential letter
7/28 to Griffith, "my dear general"
Bragging about the Constabulary
Bandholtz lost no opportunity to tout the merits, popularity, and general necessity of the Constabulary to all who would listen. Bandholtz' high opinion of the Constabulary (especially when compared with the Scouts, a rival outfit) was barely dented by the Davao mutiny and suffered not at all from smaller-scale setbacks, for instance a case of harassment which was immediately buried with help from the Manila police. Generally, Bandholtz never lost a chance to report when "public opinion" favored the Scouts, or to hold up what may have been political windfalls (when the Philippine Assembly increased the Constabulary's budget) as evidence of a job well done. Worth noting at this point is who it was who had such high opinions -- generally, it was American business owners.
Badmouthing the Scouts:
3/2 to Fred A Joss (bare acquaintance)
5/4 to Col Mark Hershey (intimate acquaintance -- badmouthing the Scouts cuts across lines)
Praising the Constabulary
2/26 to Major Henry T Allen
7/5 to Harbord (AFTER mutiny, still good opinion)
7/22 to Harbord (how far the Constabulary has come since the early days)
Favorable Budget - real bragging tone to these
4/3 to Colonel JC White
5/4 to Colonel Mark Hershey
5/17 to General Mark Allen
6/5 to Harbord
6/6 to Major Ralph Jones
6/6 to Col. Mark Hershey
Good Public Opinion/Whose public opinion
3/25 from J Riothiu, people are "crying out" for Constabulary letter is "highly colored" (Bandholtz' own words)
7/20 "if there's one thing this business has shown, it's how strong public opinion is on the side of the Constabulary"
7/7 from Harbord, "I am a little suspicious of the methods of a mestizo officers whom outside Americans praise so highly"
We're Having Trouble in Samar, Sir
This refers to an exchange of letters between Bandholtz and J Riouthiu. Riothiu, the district director of Samar, writes to ask about the colonial policy on bandits, how much it is permissible to offer them in exchange for their surrender, and whether the US military is bound to uphold promises made by the (Filipino) governor. He also write to say that conditions are much, much worse in the South. In response, Bandholtz cites his experiences with central Luzon "bandits" and says that only unconditional surrender with a promise of "due process" is allowed, and that this has lead to favorable results, ie the army was free to hang the ones that needed to be hung and pardon the ones that needed to be pardoned. Riothiu's response, paraphrases, is "With all due respect sir, these men are wild animals who don't understand our laws." This shows: 1) endemic lack of information, 2) underestimation (on Bandholtz' part) of the seriousness of the situation in the South, and 3) underestimation of perspicacity of the natives (here, as in other places, it is assumed that they can be fooled/are routinely fooled into acting against their own interests)
Samar
3/27 from Riothiu
4/3 to Lieutenant-Colonel JC White
4/13 from Riothiu
The Japanese Conspiracy and "sedition"
Bandholtz tended not to question the underlying feasibility of the colonial project in the South, and to discount or undercount the drive of Filipinos to work toward their own self-interest. Combined with a healthy sense of paranoia, this meant that he sometimes tended to view expressions of political discontent as evidence of unfair racial bias.
Others went further, and linking editors of El Reciemento and other "seditious" newspapers with Japanese spying. Bandholtz' enthusiasm for this topic was muted compared to the enthusiasm of certain members of the War Department back in the States, to whom he was instructed to send relevant newspaper clippings. The only time he personally endorsed this theory was in a letter to the editor of the Manila Times which seems likely to have been designed for publication first and the expression of an honest opinion a distant, distant second.
Bias
3/23 to General Wood, papers are seditious, strikers complaints are purely racial
3/23 to Col Hershy, the same
Japan
3/23 to Major Cornelius Wilcov, cover letter enclosing 3/20 newclipping concerning possible Reciamento/Japanese linkages
5/14 from War Department, expressing interest in Japan link
6/03 to Martin Egan, editor of Manila Times, "peculiar coincidence" of editor of Reciemento been in Davao before uprisin
And, finally,
Davao
The mutiny took place while Bandholtz was on an inspection tour, which had been organized in response to repeated rumors concerning the severity of the situation in Samar and Mindanao. During the first leg of the tour, his reactions were favorable. He seems to have viewed the mutiny at Davao as a "purely local and sporadic affair," one that hit "like thunder out of a clear blue sky." Harbord blamed the mutiny on various things, primarily weak/rushed inspection tours, and the unpreventable actions of three poorly supervised officers (two involved "directly" and one "indirectly"). He reported to outsiders that the situation was "well in hand" and to insiders that he was furious, but otherwise his conclusions seem to have matched -- excepting the one conspiracy-themed letter to the editor of the Manila Times. Having stayed a week and seen to the capture/execution of most of the mutineers, Harbord left, confident that he had gotten to the bottom of the affair and that it had been handled as best as could be expected. However, he dispatched a follow-up group of military investigators, mainly on the assumption that it would look better to have an official confirmation of his own opinions (something he was confident would happen).
Rumors
J Riothiu in Samar
5/6 to General Allen, situation "if anything a trifle worse" than conditions in central Luzon
5/6 to Col Herman Hall, concerned about the Moro situation
5/6 to son Will, Moros are raising the devil
Initial Impressions
6/5 to Harbord, on tour, Davao situation is "no doubt" simply labor troubles
6/7 to Major Harry Howland, no trouble yet, but doing this for Forbes
6/21 from Harbord, Harbord ventures guesses at causes of mutiny
6/13, to Major Howland, just received news, can't venture any guesses
6/13 from Griffith, "this Davao situation is rather discouraging, no use guessing"
7/2 to Hershey, "like a clap of thunder out of a clear blue sky"
Assessment
6/29 to Colonel Rivers, confidential, need better inspections, inexplicable native nature won't complain to inspectors
6/29 to Howland, "damned affair"
7/2, above letter re-written, "brave show" of Constabulary in rounding up the mutineers
7/7 to GC Harvey, an outsider, "situation is well in hand"
7/24 to Fred Capenter, private secretary to President, summarizing situation and repeating conclusions
7/22, to Leonard Wood, same but less formal tone
Board to Confirm my Conclusions
7/5 to Harbord
7/7 to Rivers
7/19 to Harbord, mentions Griffiths
CONCLUSIONS
1. Endemic Lack of Information - recognized problem but didn't recognize how deep.
2. Endemic lack of quality officers - frequent complaint, recognized problem
3. Underestimation of Filipino ability to act in their own self interest - this leads to outlandish claims and weird conspiracy theories
4. Jokes at expense of (especially) the Philippine assembly - casually dismissive attitude here
5. Country-club promotions - Ford and Griffiths are examples of this
6. The Constabulary is All Right - it's the best damn outfit in the Philippines
7. Believes that he has "learned his lesson" from Davao - better inspections, recruit higher quality of officer
Amusingly, the day after returning from Davao, Bandholtz ordered three books from the Manila presses:
"History of Sulu"
"Studies in Moro History"
"Manual of Philippine Birds"
Apparently he felt the need to touch up on these subjects.
On the balance...I learned a lot? Ahaha. Ha. This was an easy class, meaning we hardly did any reading for it, meaning the research I did for this paper WAS my course. It felt a bit like being thrown in the river during monsoon season, actually. Without a lifejacket (background in the region/skills honed over multiple semesters as a social science major).
NEVER AGAIN.
Wait wait, I don't have to worry about this anymore! I'm free! (I still can't believe it.) Today an undergrad, tomorrow a BA! (Some part of me feels that this should be automatic: of course you have a college degree. But then tonight, I went out to dinner with my uncle, and he was SO impressed, because of course, on that side of the family, only my father has more than a high school education. That made me feel a bit better. Actually, it made me remember high school: graduation was a huge deal then too (Franklin High has a 65% graduation rate). And then I started feeling like I had double vision, because those facts barely touch me. ^^; The fact is, my parents are educated, intelligent, and they make a ton of money; I have the worst entitlement/privilege complex of anyone I know. Consider this entry: it's nothing but excuses, everything from bad study habits to possible mental disorders. (And now background! *strikes a pose*) The real lesson here probably is, WHINING LESS MEANS DOING MORE. Probably. And on that note...)
Bed! Bed!
What happened was that my parents, grandfather, uncle and younger brother all drove out to offer support (and attend the commencement ceremony, which is tomorrow). Then my brother sat behind me ALL DAY TODAY until the paper was finished. Exactly as if he were one of those tyrannical Japanese live-in editors. -_-; I felt a bit bad for monopolizing his time, but when I asked him later, he said he enjoyed it. How sick is that?!
Sick or not, having him there was INSANELY HELPFUL. I'm used to writing all my papers alone, you see. I never finish far enough ahead of deadline to bother with peer review, and since all my friends are in the sciences (not the social sciences), I don't even really have anyone I can talk over my ideas with. (In retrospect, I should probably have just called home and talked to my parents, or something.) So writing papers was always very lonely.
Plus, I have a bad habit going obsessive when I can least afford it -- reading my opening paragraph 29 times without being able to move on, checking a quick reference and not being able to pry myself away from the book, or (in this case) spend far, far too much time on the outline. (I really had problems tearing myself away from the outline. It's seven pages. Single-spaced. The paper itself was only supposed to be 10 pages (double-spaced)! ORZ X INFINITY.) Having my brother there was great; having any warm body there to look over my shoulder and point out that I rewrote that paragraph five times already, how many more times do I want to re-write it, would have been a blessing.
What this is all leading up to is, I worked fairly hard on this paper and I didn't get any credit on it. THEREFORE (the reasoning goes), I should post it to livejournal. But the paper would be overkill
Lessons of the Davao Mutiny
I reviewed the personal correspondence of Harry Hill Bandholtz from January 1909, when he and his wife returned to their house in Manila after an extended vacation and Bandholtz resumed his post as director of the Philippine Constabulary, through July 1909, when Bandholtz outlined his vision for the Constabulary based on what he saw as its major strengths and weaknesses, informed by the "lessons" he learned from the mutiny of eleven Constabulary recruits in Davao, Mindanao, on June 6, 1909.
Bandholtz' letters are a series of conversations. There are, first of all, cases of a single topic sustained between two people. Looking through these, I was able to follow the threads of various events are they unfolded over the course of the six month period I was examining. There are a number of these threads in the paper, which I will try to relate back to my central theme.
Another way to view the letters as conversation is to compare multiple letters on a single topic. Bandholtz had a habit of recounting the same event to a pool of regular correspondents, each time writing with a slightly different tone -- different levels of formality or forthrightness -- depending on Bandholtz's relationship with the recipient, their "security clearance," the purpose of the letter, etc. By comparing multiple versions of the same event, I wanted to get a sense -- not necessarily of what Bandholtz "really thought," but of which facts he believed were the most worth mentioning, which he considered unsuitable for a larger audience, and, finally, where his various correspondents stood in relation to himself.
Because Bandholtz's personal correspondence naturally lends itself to conversation in this way, this paper will be organized, not by theme, but by topic. What I mean is that rather than begin with conclusions and then present letters as they relate to these conclusions, the paper is instead organized around topics of conversation, with conclusions drawn from each topic then related back to an overall set of conclusions.
Networking
Bandholtz maintained a series of sometimes distinct, sometimes overlapping networks.
-fraternal societies (Saladin Temple, Masonic Squires, Order of Angell, A.A.O.N.M.S, Knights Templar) and old army buddies
--letters: 5/4 to Captain HF Reuthers, 5/6 to son Will, 5/15 to unknown, 5/29 from Harbord, 6/13 to Commander NW Gilbert
--letters: 6/2 to George Geo D (?), 7/17 from G Curry the governor of New Mexico, many many more
-US politicians (calling in favors -- much more regular, informal, informative letters to army friends though)
--6/03 to Rep. EL Hamilton, 6/03 to Sen. Burrows, "friends" working toward Judge Trent's Supreme Court appointment
Philippine Politicians (getting things done with assistance from Quezon and Osmena), Manilla Business, Police, the Times
--3/11 to Cap. GM Wray of the Scouts, building a railroad with Quezon
--5/28 from Harbord, working with opposition politicians to end strikes
--6/5 to Harbord, "good relations" with police
--7/3 to M Egan, editor of the Manila Times, "very helpful"
Short section, not much more than dropping names, illustrating the importance of informal networks, what they can and can't accomplish. Bandholtz' power lies with the army -- mostly with officers also posted, or formerly posted, to the Philippines, or with bureaucrats in the War Department who rely on him for information -- and with a specific set of Philippine politicians with whom he is personally acquainted. Basic projects in the Philippines rely on native cooperation; Bandholtz' influence on US politicians is limited. Nevertheless, the sense of being at the center of a personal universe is strong, supported by a continual stream of personal requests for promotion. This causes an inflated sense of own importance, illustrated by incident involving a local business owner and his Filippina employee (his high-handed intercession gets her fired -- 3/11). Furthermore, as this network is based on correspondence, skill as a letter-writer becomes all-important; Bandholtz is inclined to view favorably, and promote, those officers who can write good letters and/or throw good parties. But inter-American social skills do not necessarily translate to good relations with Filipino politicians (which are crucial!!!) or skilled administration. (See: Dillworth Ford and Cap. Griffith, more on them later.) Bandholtz himself warns cronies Rivers and Harbord off this kind of "country clubism" as it relates to the supposed unfitness of Captain Dietritch to be senior inspector (4/07 letter to Harbord, in response to 4/04 letter from Harbord).
The Philippine Assembly
When Harbord returns to Philippines in January, it's his first time seeing the Philippine Assembly "in action." His reaction to the assembly is typical of the way he processes information generally: first cautious interest, then an initial assessment, then analysis of what they can do for him and him for them, and then, finally, dismissal once he feels he has understood the limits of the arrangement and the terms on which it operates. Overlying all this is a casually dismissive attitude: generally the "antics" of the Assembly are harmless, sometimes they are a (fatal) distraction from the real work at hand.
Initial Impressions
1/9/07 to Honorable AL Lawshe, Assistant Post-master General
2/20 to Mr. HF Colman (stamp buddy)
Uses
2/26 to Major Henry T. Allen
2/26 to General CR Edwards, War Department
5/17 to Forbes
Limitations/Dismissal
5/04 to Captain HF Reuthers
5/10 to George Mooser, China Mutual Life Insurance Co. Shanghai
5/17 to General CR Edwards, War Department
6/22 to Geo B Colton, War Department
7/04 to ????
The Case of Dillworth Ford
Upon return, Harbord sent out letters soliciting suggestions from Constabulary officers on how best the outfit could be improved. He received only one reply (or only he felt was worth retaining), from officer Dillworth Ford. Ford's letter is remarkable, first because it well-written (almost on the level of Bandholtz' own letters) and second because Bandholtz attempted to put into practice nearly every suggestion in it -- with mixed results). Ford himself was promoted two ranks, which seems to have caused some problems for him; additionally, he was assigned to a post (Senior inspector) he seems not to have been entirely qualified for. This illustrates 1) the primacy Bandholtz placed on a single skill set, in this case the ability to write a good letter, and 2) the lack of sufficiently talented, qualified, and connected young American officers to fill essential posts within the Constabulary, a topic also addressed in the letter itself.
Letters:
2/3, the initial letter from Ford
3/31, first attempt to institute advice
5/6 to Col Herman Hall @ Iloilo, "in regard to Ford, I guess you are right, he will never make a good senior inspector"
6/5 to Harbord, problems implementing Ford's advice
6/6 to Major Ralph Jones, Iloilo more problems re: Ford's advice (in response Bandholtz' letter of 4/17)
Officer Griffith
Harbord met officer Griffith, the senior inspector of Zamboangas, while on tour in the south. He formed a favorable impression of his social characters (while harboring doubts on his abilities), and immediately added him to his networks of correspondents, as well as promoting him (to major - 7/19 letter to Harbord), thus securing his place among both formal and informal power networks.
7/5 to Harbord, Griffith has "done wonders for the social atmosphere down here" but has the following flaws
7/28 to Griffith, confidential letter
7/28 to Griffith, "my dear general"
Bragging about the Constabulary
Bandholtz lost no opportunity to tout the merits, popularity, and general necessity of the Constabulary to all who would listen. Bandholtz' high opinion of the Constabulary (especially when compared with the Scouts, a rival outfit) was barely dented by the Davao mutiny and suffered not at all from smaller-scale setbacks, for instance a case of harassment which was immediately buried with help from the Manila police. Generally, Bandholtz never lost a chance to report when "public opinion" favored the Scouts, or to hold up what may have been political windfalls (when the Philippine Assembly increased the Constabulary's budget) as evidence of a job well done. Worth noting at this point is who it was who had such high opinions -- generally, it was American business owners.
Badmouthing the Scouts:
3/2 to Fred A Joss (bare acquaintance)
5/4 to Col Mark Hershey (intimate acquaintance -- badmouthing the Scouts cuts across lines)
Praising the Constabulary
2/26 to Major Henry T Allen
7/5 to Harbord (AFTER mutiny, still good opinion)
7/22 to Harbord (how far the Constabulary has come since the early days)
Favorable Budget - real bragging tone to these
4/3 to Colonel JC White
5/4 to Colonel Mark Hershey
5/17 to General Mark Allen
6/5 to Harbord
6/6 to Major Ralph Jones
6/6 to Col. Mark Hershey
Good Public Opinion/Whose public opinion
3/25 from J Riothiu, people are "crying out" for Constabulary letter is "highly colored" (Bandholtz' own words)
7/20 "if there's one thing this business has shown, it's how strong public opinion is on the side of the Constabulary"
7/7 from Harbord, "I am a little suspicious of the methods of a mestizo officers whom outside Americans praise so highly"
We're Having Trouble in Samar, Sir
This refers to an exchange of letters between Bandholtz and J Riouthiu. Riothiu, the district director of Samar, writes to ask about the colonial policy on bandits, how much it is permissible to offer them in exchange for their surrender, and whether the US military is bound to uphold promises made by the (Filipino) governor. He also write to say that conditions are much, much worse in the South. In response, Bandholtz cites his experiences with central Luzon "bandits" and says that only unconditional surrender with a promise of "due process" is allowed, and that this has lead to favorable results, ie the army was free to hang the ones that needed to be hung and pardon the ones that needed to be pardoned. Riothiu's response, paraphrases, is "With all due respect sir, these men are wild animals who don't understand our laws." This shows: 1) endemic lack of information, 2) underestimation (on Bandholtz' part) of the seriousness of the situation in the South, and 3) underestimation of perspicacity of the natives (here, as in other places, it is assumed that they can be fooled/are routinely fooled into acting against their own interests)
Samar
3/27 from Riothiu
4/3 to Lieutenant-Colonel JC White
4/13 from Riothiu
The Japanese Conspiracy and "sedition"
Bandholtz tended not to question the underlying feasibility of the colonial project in the South, and to discount or undercount the drive of Filipinos to work toward their own self-interest. Combined with a healthy sense of paranoia, this meant that he sometimes tended to view expressions of political discontent as evidence of unfair racial bias.
Others went further, and linking editors of El Reciemento and other "seditious" newspapers with Japanese spying. Bandholtz' enthusiasm for this topic was muted compared to the enthusiasm of certain members of the War Department back in the States, to whom he was instructed to send relevant newspaper clippings. The only time he personally endorsed this theory was in a letter to the editor of the Manila Times which seems likely to have been designed for publication first and the expression of an honest opinion a distant, distant second.
Bias
3/23 to General Wood, papers are seditious, strikers complaints are purely racial
3/23 to Col Hershy, the same
Japan
3/23 to Major Cornelius Wilcov, cover letter enclosing 3/20 newclipping concerning possible Reciamento/Japanese linkages
5/14 from War Department, expressing interest in Japan link
6/03 to Martin Egan, editor of Manila Times, "peculiar coincidence" of editor of Reciemento been in Davao before uprisin
And, finally,
Davao
The mutiny took place while Bandholtz was on an inspection tour, which had been organized in response to repeated rumors concerning the severity of the situation in Samar and Mindanao. During the first leg of the tour, his reactions were favorable. He seems to have viewed the mutiny at Davao as a "purely local and sporadic affair," one that hit "like thunder out of a clear blue sky." Harbord blamed the mutiny on various things, primarily weak/rushed inspection tours, and the unpreventable actions of three poorly supervised officers (two involved "directly" and one "indirectly"). He reported to outsiders that the situation was "well in hand" and to insiders that he was furious, but otherwise his conclusions seem to have matched -- excepting the one conspiracy-themed letter to the editor of the Manila Times. Having stayed a week and seen to the capture/execution of most of the mutineers, Harbord left, confident that he had gotten to the bottom of the affair and that it had been handled as best as could be expected. However, he dispatched a follow-up group of military investigators, mainly on the assumption that it would look better to have an official confirmation of his own opinions (something he was confident would happen).
Rumors
J Riothiu in Samar
5/6 to General Allen, situation "if anything a trifle worse" than conditions in central Luzon
5/6 to Col Herman Hall, concerned about the Moro situation
5/6 to son Will, Moros are raising the devil
Initial Impressions
6/5 to Harbord, on tour, Davao situation is "no doubt" simply labor troubles
6/7 to Major Harry Howland, no trouble yet, but doing this for Forbes
6/21 from Harbord, Harbord ventures guesses at causes of mutiny
6/13, to Major Howland, just received news, can't venture any guesses
6/13 from Griffith, "this Davao situation is rather discouraging, no use guessing"
7/2 to Hershey, "like a clap of thunder out of a clear blue sky"
Assessment
6/29 to Colonel Rivers, confidential, need better inspections, inexplicable native nature won't complain to inspectors
6/29 to Howland, "damned affair"
7/2, above letter re-written, "brave show" of Constabulary in rounding up the mutineers
7/7 to GC Harvey, an outsider, "situation is well in hand"
7/24 to Fred Capenter, private secretary to President, summarizing situation and repeating conclusions
7/22, to Leonard Wood, same but less formal tone
Board to Confirm my Conclusions
7/5 to Harbord
7/7 to Rivers
7/19 to Harbord, mentions Griffiths
CONCLUSIONS
1. Endemic Lack of Information - recognized problem but didn't recognize how deep.
2. Endemic lack of quality officers - frequent complaint, recognized problem
3. Underestimation of Filipino ability to act in their own self interest - this leads to outlandish claims and weird conspiracy theories
4. Jokes at expense of (especially) the Philippine assembly - casually dismissive attitude here
5. Country-club promotions - Ford and Griffiths are examples of this
6. The Constabulary is All Right - it's the best damn outfit in the Philippines
7. Believes that he has "learned his lesson" from Davao - better inspections, recruit higher quality of officer
Amusingly, the day after returning from Davao, Bandholtz ordered three books from the Manila presses:
"History of Sulu"
"Studies in Moro History"
"Manual of Philippine Birds"
Apparently he felt the need to touch up on these subjects.
On the balance...I learned a lot? Ahaha. Ha. This was an easy class, meaning we hardly did any reading for it, meaning the research I did for this paper WAS my course. It felt a bit like being thrown in the river during monsoon season, actually. Without a lifejacket (background in the region/skills honed over multiple semesters as a social science major).
NEVER AGAIN.
Wait wait, I don't have to worry about this anymore! I'm free! (I still can't believe it.) Today an undergrad, tomorrow a BA! (Some part of me feels that this should be automatic: of course you have a college degree. But then tonight, I went out to dinner with my uncle, and he was SO impressed, because of course, on that side of the family, only my father has more than a high school education. That made me feel a bit better. Actually, it made me remember high school: graduation was a huge deal then too (Franklin High has a 65% graduation rate). And then I started feeling like I had double vision, because those facts barely touch me. ^^; The fact is, my parents are educated, intelligent, and they make a ton of money; I have the worst entitlement/privilege complex of anyone I know. Consider this entry: it's nothing but excuses, everything from bad study habits to possible mental disorders. (And now background! *strikes a pose*) The real lesson here probably is, WHINING LESS MEANS DOING MORE. Probably. And on that note...)
Bed! Bed!